Wanting and Intending: Elements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind, Roughley Neil

Автор: Dennett D. C., Dennett Daniel C.
Название: Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting
ISBN: 0262527790 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780262527798
Издательство: MIT Press
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Цена: 28160.00 T
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Описание: "In [his] ... 1984 work on free will, Daniel Dennett makes a case for compatibilism. His aim, as he writes in the preface to this new edition, was a cleanup job, `saving everything that mattered about the everyday concept of free will, while jettisoning the impediments.` In Elbow Room, Dennett argues that the varieties of free will worth wanting --those that underwrite moral and artistic responsibility--are not threatened by advances in science but distinguished, explained, and justified in detail"--Page 4 of cover.

Автор: Vallor Shannon
Название: Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth Wanting
ISBN: 019049851X ISBN-13(EAN): 9780190498511
Издательство: Oxford Academ
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Цена: 52260.00 T
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Описание: New technologies from artificial intelligence to drones, and biomedical enhancement make the future of the human family increasingly hard to predict and protect. This book explores how the philosophical tradition of virtue ethics can help us to cultivate the moral wisdom we need to live wisely and well with emerging technologies.

Автор: Neil Roughley
Название: Wanting and Intending
ISBN: 9401773858 ISBN-13(EAN): 9789401773850
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 139750.00 T
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Описание: Acknowledgments.- Introduction.- Part 1. Wanting.- 1. The Question of Motivational Unity: Historical Preliminaries.- 1.1. Practical Mind: Aristotle's Question.- 1.2. Plato and the Tripartite Practical Mind.- 1.3. Aristotle and the Problems of Motivational Unity.- 1.4. Hobbes and Double Reductionism.-1.5. Hume and Hedonic Unity.-1.6 From Stevenson to Davidson: "Pro-Attitudes".- 2. Motivational States.- 2.1. Starting Point: The Things We Do.- 2.2. Behaviour.- 2.3. Motivation and Representation.- 2.4. Representational Match and Representational Mode.- 2.5. The Two Dimensions of Motivation.- 2.6. Excursus: Motivating Representations in Non-Human Animals.- 3. Wanting* and its Symptoms.- 3.1. Wanting*: Factoring out Believing and Fuelling.- 3.2. Symptoms of Wanting*.- 3.3. Symptomatic Definition.- 3.4. A Theory of Wanting*: Key Questions and Sketch of Some Answers.- 4. Expressive Explication and the Optative Mode.- 4.1. Moore's Paradox and the Idea of Expressive Explication.- 4.2. Optative and Assertoric Expression.- 4.3. Axiological Conceptions of Wanting*.- 4.4. Wants* as Mere Entailments.- 4.5. Appendix: Direction of Fit and the Internal Normativity of Attitudinising.- 5. Wanting*, Consciousness and Affect.- 5.1. Conscious Occurrentism.- 5.2. Not Really Wanting.- 5.3. Wanting* and Affect.- 5.4. End of Part I.- Part 2. Intending.- 6. Intention, Belief and Commitment.- 6.1. Introduction: The Irreducibility Thesis and the Role of Belief.- 6.2. Intention Expression.- 6.3. The Conceptual Marginality of Belief.- 6.4. Doxastic Symptoms of (Decisional).- 6.5. Summary: Postdecisional Commitment and Belief.- 7. The Intentional Syndrome: Characteristic Causal Features and Rational Requirements.- 7.1. Characteristic Causal Features: Dimensions of Intention Strength.- 7.2. Deontic Consequences: The Intention-Consequential Requirements.- 7.3. The Intentional Syndrome: Taking Stock.- 8. Deciding.- 8.1. Towards a Genetic Disjunctive Theory of Intention: The Itinerary of the Next Three Chapters.-8.2. Decision: Two Not Particularly Helpful Theories.- 8.3. Deciding and Judging.- 8.4. Minimal Inquiry and Judgement.- 8.5. Minimal Deliberation and Decision.- 8.6. Why Decisions are not Actions.- 8.7. Decisions as Deliberation-Terminative Optative Occurrences.- 9. Intentions Decisional and Nondecisional.- 9.1. Decisional Intentions.- 9.2. Five Ways to Nondecisionally Intend.- 9.3. Doxastic Conceptual Constraints.- 9.4. Being Set: Nondecisional Intention and Motivation.- 9.5. Nondecisional Intention and Conscious Wanting*.- 9.6. Leaving the Question Open.- 9.7. Intentions, Decisional and Nondecisional.- 10. The Intention-Consequential Requirements and Anchoring Attributability.- 10.1. Intention Noncognitivism and the IC Requirements.- 10.2. Bratman's Proposal: Self-Governance and Intention Holism.- 10.3. The IC Requirements, Self-Governance and Normative Functionalism.- 10.4. Anchoring Attributabilityght: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold">.- 10.5. Taking Responsibility and Practical Rationality.- 10.6. Conclusion: Intention and Normative Culture.- Index.