Neil Roughley Wanting and Intending 9789401773850

Варианты приобретения

Цена: 139750.00T
Кол-во:
Наличие: Поставка под заказ. Есть в наличии на складе поставщика.
Склад Америка: 155 шт.
При оформлении заказа до: 2025-07-28
Ориентировочная дата поставки: Август-начало Сентября
При условии наличия книги у поставщика.

Добавить в корзину

в Мои желания

Автор: Neil Roughley
Название: Wanting and Intending
ISBN: 9789401773850
Издательство: Springer
Классификация:

Философия: метафизика и онтология

Философия сознания

Этика и философия нравов

ISBN-10: 9401773858
Обложка/Формат: Hardcover
Страницы: 364
Вес: 0.72 кг.
Дата издания: 10.03.2016
Серия: Philosophical Studies Series
Язык: English
Размер: 234 x 156 x 22
Основная тема: Philosophy
Подзаголовок: Elements of a Philosophy of Practical Mind
Ссылка на Издательство: Link
Рейтинг:
Поставляется из: Германии
Описание: Acknowledgments.- Introduction.- Part 1. Wanting.- 1. The Question of Motivational Unity: Historical Preliminaries.- 1.1. Practical Mind: Aristotles Question.- 1.2. Plato and the Tripartite Practical Mind.- 1.3. Aristotle and the Problems of Motivational Unity.- 1.4. Hobbes and Double Reductionism.-1.5. Hume and Hedonic Unity.-1.6 From Stevenson to Davidson: Pro-Attitudes.- 2. Motivational States.- 2.1. Starting Point: The Things We Do.- 2.2. Behaviour.- 2.3. Motivation and Representation.- 2.4. Representational Match and Representational Mode.- 2.5. The Two Dimensions of Motivation.- 2.6. Excursus: Motivating Representations in Non-Human Animals.- 3. Wanting* and its Symptoms.- 3.1. Wanting*: Factoring out Believing and Fuelling.- 3.2. Symptoms of Wanting*.- 3.3. Symptomatic Definition.- 3.4. A Theory of Wanting*: Key Questions and Sketch of Some Answers.- 4. Expressive Explication and the Optative Mode.- 4.1. Moores Paradox and the Idea of Expressive Explication.- 4.2. Optative and Assertoric Expression.- 4.3. Axiological Conceptions of Wanting*.- 4.4. Wants* as Mere Entailments.- 4.5. Appendix: Direction of Fit and the Internal Normativity of Attitudinising.- 5. Wanting*, Consciousness and Affect.- 5.1. Conscious Occurrentism.- 5.2. Not Really Wanting.- 5.3. Wanting* and Affect.- 5.4. End of Part I.- Part 2. Intending.- 6. Intention, Belief and Commitment.- 6.1. Introduction: The Irreducibility Thesis and the Role of Belief.- 6.2. Intention Expression.- 6.3. The Conceptual Marginality of Belief.- 6.4. Doxastic Symptoms of (Decisional).- 6.5. Summary: Postdecisional Commitment and Belief.- 7. The Intentional Syndrome: Characteristic Causal Features and Rational Requirements.- 7.1. Characteristic Causal Features: Dimensions of Intention Strength.- 7.2. Deontic Consequences: The Intention-Consequential Requirements.- 7.3. The Intentional Syndrome: Taking Stock.- 8. Deciding.- 8.1. Towards a Genetic Disjunctive Theory of Intention: The Itinerary of the Next Three Chapters.-8.2. Decision: Two Not Particularly Helpful Theories.- 8.3. Deciding and Judging.- 8.4. Minimal Inquiry and Judgement.- 8.5. Minimal Deliberation and Decision.- 8.6. Why Decisions are not Actions.- 8.7. Decisions as Deliberation-Terminative Optative Occurrences.- 9. Intentions Decisional and Nondecisional.- 9.1. Decisional Intentions.- 9.2. Five Ways to Nondecisionally Intend.- 9.3. Doxastic Conceptual Constraints.- 9.4. Being Set: Nondecisional Intention and Motivation.- 9.5. Nondecisional Intention and Conscious Wanting*.- 9.6. Leaving the Question Open.- 9.7. Intentions, Decisional and Nondecisional.- 10. The Intention-Consequential Requirements and Anchoring Attributability.- 10.1. Intention Noncognitivism and the IC Requirements.- 10.2. Bratmans Proposal: Self-Governance and Intention Holism.- 10.3. The IC Requirements, Self-Governance and Normative Functionalism.- 10.4. Anchoring Attributabilityght: normal; mso-bidi-font-weight: bold>.- 10.5. Taking Responsibility and Practical Rationality.- 10.6. Conclusion: Intention and Normative Culture.- Index.

Wanting and Intending, Neil Roughley