Mathematics of Voting and Apportionment, El-Helaly Sherif

Автор: Friedrich Pukelsheim
Название: Proportional Representation
ISBN: 3319647067 ISBN-13(EAN): 9783319647067
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 60550.00 T
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Описание: The book offers an in-depth study of the translation of vote counts into seat numbers in proportional representation systems - an approach guided by practical needs.

Автор: Jones
Название: Delegate Apportionment in the US Presidential Primaries
ISBN: 3031249534 ISBN-13(EAN): 9783031249532
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 93160.00 T
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Описание: This book provides a comprehensive mathematical description and analysis of the delegate allocation processes in the US Democratic and Republican presidential primaries, focusing on the role of apportionment methods and the effect of thresholds—the minimum levels of support required to receive delegates. The analysis involves a variety of techniques, including theoretical arguments, simplicial geometry, Monte Carlo simulation, and examination of presidential primary data from 2004 to 2020. The book is divided into two parts: Part I defines the classical apportionment problem and explains how the implementation and goals of delegate apportionment differ from those of apportionment for state representation in the US House of Representatives and for party representation in legislatures based on proportional representation. The authors then describe how delegates are assigned to states and congressional districts and formally define the delegate apportionment methods used in each state by the two major parties to allocate delegates to presidential candidates. Part II analyzes and compares the apportionment methods introduced in Part I based on their level of bias and adherence to various notions of proportionality. It explores how often the methods satisfy the quota condition and quantifies their biases in favor or against the strongest and weakest candidates. Because the methods are quota-based, they are susceptible to classical paradoxes like the Alabama and population paradoxes. They also suffer from other paradoxes that are more relevant in the context of delegate apportionment such as the elimination and aggregation paradoxes. The book evaluates the extent to which each method is susceptible to each paradox. Finally, it discusses the appointment of delegates based on divisor methods and notions of regressive proportionality. This book appeals to scholars and students interested in mathematical economics and political science, with an emphasis on apportionment and social choice theory.

Автор: Meir Reshef
Название: Strategic Voting
ISBN: 1681733595 ISBN-13(EAN): 9781681733593
Издательство: Mare Nostrum (Eurospan)
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Цена: 66530.00 T
Наличие на складе: Невозможна поставка.
Описание: Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting.There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science.The book has two parts. The first part asks ""are there voting rules that are truthful?"" in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design such as locating a facility that serves multiple users.In the second part, we ask ""what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically?"" rather than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social welfare.We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in future development of game theoretic voting models.

Автор: Alan D. Taylor; Allison M. Pacelli
Название: Mathematics and Politics
ISBN: 1441926615 ISBN-13(EAN): 9781441926616
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 46570.00 T
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Описание: This revised book teaches humanities majors the accessibility and beauty of discrete and deductive mathematics. It assumes no prior knowledge of either college-level mathematics or political science, and could be offered at the freshman or sophomore level.

Автор: Wallis W.D.
Название: Mathematics of Elections and Voting
ISBN: 3319098098 ISBN-13(EAN): 9783319098098
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 37260.00 T
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Описание: This title takes an in-depth look at the mathematics in the context of voting and electoral systems, with focus on simple ballots, complex elections, fairness, approval voting, ties, fair and unfair voting, and manipulation techniques.

Автор: Pacelli, Allison M. Taylor, Alan
Название: Mathematics and politics
ISBN: 0387776435 ISBN-13(EAN): 9780387776439
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 55890.00 T
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Описание: As a text for an undergraduate mathematics course for nonmajors, Mathematics and Politics requires no prerequisites in either area while the underlying philosophy involves minimizing algebraic computations and focusing instead on some conceptual aspects of mathematics in the context of important real-world questions in political science.

Автор: Reshef Meir
Название: Strategic Voting
ISBN: 1681733617 ISBN-13(EAN): 9781681733616
Издательство: Mare Nostrum (Eurospan)
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Цена: 87780.00 T
Наличие на складе: Невозможна поставка.
Описание: Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting.There are many different voting rules in use and even more in the literature, owing to the various considerations such an aggregation method should take into account. The analysis of voting scenarios becomes particularly challenging in the presence of strategic voters, that is, voters that misreport their true preferences in an attempt to obtain a more favorable outcome. In a world that is tightly connected by the Internet, where multiple groups with complex incentives make frequent joint decisions, the interest in strategic voting exceeds the scope of political science and is a focus of research in economics, game theory, sociology, mathematics, and computer science.The book has two parts. The first part asks ""are there voting rules that are truthful?"" in the sense that all voters have an incentive to report their true preferences. The seminal Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem excludes the existence of such voting rules under certain requirements. From this starting point, we survey both extensions of the theorem and various conditions under which truthful voting is made possible (such as restricted preference domains). We also explore the connections with other problems of mechanism design such as locating a facility that serves multiple users.In the second part, we ask ""what would be the outcome when voters do vote strategically?"" rather than trying to prevent such behavior. We overview various game-theoretic models and equilibrium concepts from the literature, demonstrate how they apply to voting games, and discuss their implications on social welfare.We conclude with a brief survey of empirical and experimental findings that could play a key role in future development of game theoretic voting models.

Автор: Bruno Simeone; Friedrich Pukelsheim
Название: Mathematics and Democracy
ISBN: 3642071333 ISBN-13(EAN): 9783642071331
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 167700.00 T
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Описание: In this book, different quantitative approaches to the study of electoral systems have been developed: game-theoretic, decision-theoretic, statistical, probabilistic, combinatorial, geometric, and optimization ones. Quantitative approaches offer a powerful tool to detect inconsistencies or poor performance in actual systems.

Автор: Serafini, Paolo
Название: Mathematics to the rescue of democracy :
ISBN: 3030383679 ISBN-13(EAN): 9783030383671
Издательство: Springer
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Цена: 27940.00 T
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Описание: This book explains, in a straightforward way, the foundations upon which electoral techniques are based in order to shed new light on what we actually do when we vote.