Since the mid-1950s, successive Canadian governments have grappled with the issue of Canada’s role in US ballistic missile defence programs. Until Paul Martin’s government finally said no, policy-makers responded to US initiatives with fear and uncertainty as they endlessly debated the implications – at home and abroad – of participation. However, whether this is the end of the story remains to be seen.
Drawing on previously classified government documents and interviews with senior officials, James Fergusson examines Canada’s policy deliberations during five major US initiatives. He reveals that a combination of factors such as weak leadership and a tendency to place uncertain and ill-defined notions of international peace and security before national defence resulted in indecision on what role Canada would play in ballistic missile defence. In effect, policy-makers have failed to transform debates about the issue into an opportunity to define Canada’s strategic interests at home and on the world stage. Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense is the first comprehensive account of Canada’s response and indecision regarding US ballistic missile defence initiatives, and the implications of this inaction.
Preface
Prologue – What’s with Defence?
Act 1 – Anti-Ballistic Missiles: Don’t Worry, Be Happy (1954-71)
Act 2 – The Strategic Defence Initiative: Much Ado About Very Little (1972-85)
Act 3 – Global Protection Against Limited St
